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Abstract 
This paper aims at determining the causal relationship between FDI and corruption in 42 
developing countries using linear and non linear panel methods over the period 1998 to 2009. 
The findings show a causal association as corruption appears to Granger caused FDI and FDI 
seems to Granger lead corruption using linear methods, while for weaker results are obtain using 
non linear methods. The general value of these results is that adequate institutional facilities must 
be in place in developing economies to reduce losses from corruption especially in an attempt to 
attract foreign direct investment.  
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Introduction 
 
The growing literature on the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows suggests that corruption can have either a negative or positive effect on FDI (see 
the survey of Campos et al (2010)). Treating corruption as a factor that affects the costs of 
investment operations Bardhan (1997) argued that foreign investors would have to pay extra 
costs in the form of bribes to get licenses or government permits to conduct business and such 
additional costs would decrease the expected profitability of investment. Moreover, corruption 
increases uncertainty because corruption agreements are not enforceable in the courts of law.  
Therefore, foreign investors would tend to avoid investing in countries with high levels of 
corruption. However, a positive impact of corruption on FDI inflows could exist. In the presence 
of a stiff regulation and an inefficient bureaucracy, corruption may augment bureaucratic 
efficiency by accelerating the process of decision making (Bardhan, 1997). Empirically, the 
evidence on the effects of corruption on FDI flows has been mixed but most studies have not 
found the commonly expected conclusion that a high level of corruption deters FDI. Some 
empirical papers provide support of a negative link between corruption and FDI, while others fail 
to find any significant relationship. However, what has been omitted from this literature is 
research that allows for the possibility that FDI inflows can cause corruption activities rather 
than the other way around so that corruption may not necessarily be an independent variable.  In 
fact corruption is a consequence of economic and non-economic variables and so should be 
treated as an endogenous variable. For instance, FDI can create additional resources which 
permit a country to fight corruption effectively. On the other hand, if more FDI inflows represent 
a richer economy this can also raise the probability of individuals getting involve in corruptive 
activities. 
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It appears therefore that the causal pattern between corruption and FDI cannot be determined 
theoretically and one must undertake an empirical analysis to resolve this issue.  It should be 
noted that the previous empirical investigations undertaken on this association regressed 
corruption on FDI, which implicitly assumes that corruption is exogenous to the model; no 
analysis allowed for corruption and economic growth to be endogenous and simultaneously 
determined. By undertaking formal causality tests this paper hopes to rectify this deficiency in 
the literature. 
 
Employing a set of 42 countries covering the period 1998 to 2009 this study assesses the 
relationship between corruption and FDI using both linear and nonlinear panel causality tests. 
Linear panel causality methods are increasingly becoming quite popular in economic 
applications (see Hurlin and Venet, 2001; Hurlin, 2004; Craigwell and Moore, 2008; Greenidge 
et al., 2010). However, little examples exist in the economic literature that uses non-linear panel 
causality tests. In this regard the application here is a first for corruption and FDI studies. The 
complex nature of FDI and corruption which depend on several economic and non-economic 
indicators imply that the former two variables could follow a non-linear process and it therefore 
seems appropriate to conduct non linearity causal tests on such.  
 
The plan for this paper is as follows: the literature review is presented in Section 2, then the 
causality methods are discussed in section 3, followed by an outline of the estimated results in 
section 4 and in the final section conclusions are made. 
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2. Review of the Empirical Literature on Corruption and FDI 
The empirical studies on the impact of corruption on FDI have been done on different countries 
and over different time periods using time series and cross-national data, and to a lesser extent, 
panel data. A general conclusion from a review of this literature suggests that the expected 
relationship that a high level of corruption adversely affects FDI is not common.  Starting with 
the work of Wheeler and Mody (1992) on United States (US) firms, an insignificant association 
was discovered between the size of FDI and the host country‟s risk factor, making these authors 
conclude that the importance of the risk factor should “be discounted, although it would not be 
impossible to assign it some small weight as a decision factor (p.70).” Wei (2000a), however, 
blamed this insignificant result on the way Wheeler and Mody (1992) incorporated the 
corruption index; rather than explicitly include a corruption index into their model, they 
combined it with 12 other indicators - some of which may be marginally important for FDI - to 
form one variable.  Hines (1995) investigated the influence of the US anti-bribery legislation 
(Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977) on the operation of US firms in countries where 
corruption is high. The dependent variable he employs is the growth rate of US FDI inflows and 
this is regressed on the Business International Index used as a measure of corruption for 35 host 
countries during the period 1977 to 1982. His finding supports the hypothesis that the Corrupt 
Practices Act significantly reduced US FDI flows into more corrupt host countries after 1977. In 
a slightly different approach, Smarzynska and Wei (2002) utilize a firm-level data set from 
transition economies to investigate the effects of corruption in terms of firms‟ decision not to 
enter a particular market, rather than under the situation of reduced bilateral investment flows. 
Conditional on FDI occurring, their results show that FDI entry strategy in a corrupt host country 
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is to establish joint ventures with a domestic partner to save the transaction costs of dealing with 
local government officials rather than to create a wholly owned subsidiary.   
 
Freckleton et al (2010) study of forty two developing countries uses panel data to estimate the 
relationship among FDI, corruption and economic growth. The results suggest that lower levels 
of corruption enhance the effect of FDI on economic growth. Abed and Davoodi (2002) also 
applied cross-section and panel data methods to assess the impact that corruption has on per 
capita FDI inflows in transition economies. The evidence reveals that countries with a low level 
of corruption draw more per capita FDI. However, once the authors control for the structural 
reform factor, corruption is no longer significant, implying that structural reform is more critical 
at reducing the level of corruption in attracting FDI. Using bilateral FDI flow data from 12 
source countries to 45 host countries and three different measures of corruption, Wei (2000a) 
examines the effects of taxation and corruption on FDI and found that a rise in either the tax rate 
on multinational firms or the level of corruption in the host countries would contract inward FDI. 
In a follow up paper Wei (2000b) evaluated the impact of corruption on the composition of 
capital using bilateral capital flow data from 14 source countries to 53 host countries. The results 
lent support to the popular notion that there is a negative association between corruption and FDI 
and that the reduction in FDI caused by corruption is greater than the negative impact of 
corruption on other types of capital inflows. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) analyze the effects of 
corruption on bilateral FDI flows using a sample of 7 source countries and 89 host countries. 
They found that foreign firms tend to avoid situations where corruption is visibly present because 
corruption is considered immoral and might be an important cause of inefficiency. Using a single 
source country, Voyer and Beamish (2004) apply cross-sectional regressions to investigate the 
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effects of the level of corruption on Japanese FDI in 59 (developed and emerging) host countries. 
The results indicate that Japanese FDI is negatively related to the level of corruption especially 
in those emerging economies where there is a nonexistent or underdeveloped comprehensive 
legal system to effectively reduce illegal activities. Utilizing only cross sectional data from 52 
developing countries, Akçay (2001) estimates the effects of the level of corruption on FDI 
inflows with two different indices of corruption. He could not support the hypothesis that FDI 
and corruption are adversely associated.  
 
The above studies on corruption have concentrated on its effect on FDI.  Such analyses are 
usually undertaken with the Ordinary Least Squares method and implicitly assume that 
corruption is exogenous. If this assumption does not hold then estimates from such exercises 
could be biased and inconsistent. Indeed it is quite possible that FDI can cause corruption as 
discussed in the introduction where it was proposed that FDI creates additional resources which 
allow a country to fight corruption effectively, or on the other hand, can encourage involvement 
in corruptive activities. All of above research have ignored the fact that corruption is not 
necessarily an independent variable, and in fact, can be caused by FDI.   
 
2. Methodology and Data  
2.1 Methodology 
This paper uses the concept of statistical causation developed by Granger (1969), where a 
variable X is said to Granger cause Y, if values of Y are better predicted from past values of X, 
than from its own values. Hurlin and Venet (2001) and Hurlin (2004) applied this notion of 
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causality to panel data by allowing the autoregressive coefficients to be treated as constants 
which improve the number of observations and degrees of freedom leading to greater efficiency 
of the estimates. This procedure contrasts with the more popular approaches of Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1988), Weinhold (1996) and Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001) where the autoregressive 
coefficients can vary and efficiency is only possible with a „large time dimension‟.  
 
2.2.1 Hurlin Panel Causality Linear Tests 
The Hurlin (2004) procedure is based on the following Equation (1):  
  
 
 
p
k
p
k
itkitikkitkiit xCOCO
1 0
                               (1) 
where CO represents corruption, the individual country specific coefficients are given by , the 
autoregressive and regression coefficients on lagged values of corruption and the explanatory 
variables ( x ) that include foreign investment as a percentage of GDP (FDI) are denoted by 
 and  , respectively,  while   is the error term with classical properties. The individual effects 
  are presumed fixed along with  and   and the lag order, k, is identical (balanced) for all 
cross-section units of the panel (Hurlin, 2004).  
 
Implementing the Hurlin (2004) panel causality methodology  starts with checking for 
homogenous and instantaneous non-causality (HINC) which is based on a  Wald coefficient test 
that all the  s are equal to zero for all individuals i and all lags k. If the regression coefficients 
are not significantly different from zero, then the hypothesis is accepted which implies that the 
variable x is not Granger causing CO in the sample. Once the result indicates non-causality then 
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there is no need for further testing (Hurlin and Venet, 2001; Hurlin, 2004; Greenidge et al., 
2010). If the null hypothesis is rejected there exists the possibility that a causal relationship for 
the variables is identical across all countries in the series (Greenidge et al., 2010).  This is 
referred to as the homogeneous causality (HC) test which indicates that the regression 
coefficients are not statistically different across the countries for all lags. HC is rejected if the 
Wald statistic is significant. The rejection of the HC test requires that the regression coefficients 
must be examined for any statistically significant causal relationships across differing countries. 
This heterogeneous non-causality (HENC) test is one in which the coefficients of the lagged 
variables are checked to see if all of these terms are equal to zero or statistically different. A 
Wald statistic is also done for this calculation (Hurlin and Venet, 2001; Hurlin, 2004; Greenidge 
et al., 2010). 
 
3.3.2: Harvey and Leybourne Panel Causality Non Linear Tests 
Non linearity causality tests were first introduced by Baek and Brock (1992) using 
nonparametric methods of spatial probabilities.  However, the main problem with these tests is 
that they failed to provide appropriate statistics that have similar critical values even if the data 
being considered is a linear I(0) or I(1) process and is likewise consistent against non-linearity of 
either form (Harvey and Leybourne, 2007). This problem is rectified by Harvey and Leybourne 
(2007) and hence their methodology is adapted in this paper. I 
 
Assuming that the hypothesis being tested is FDI CO , the regression model is written as 
follows: 
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(2)   
A similar expression can be derived for FDICO   by interchanging CO and FDI in Equation 
(2).  The same steps that were undertaken with the Hurlin (2004) linear panel causality approach 
can then be followed.  
 
2.2 Data 
Besides corruption (CO) and foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP (FDI), the data 
set consists of several control variables which are augmented to the test equations to check the 
robustness of the relationship between CO and FDI. The control variables utilized are per capita 
GDP and domestic investment as a percentage of GDP (FDI_GDP) and (GR) respectively.  
These variables are self-explanatory as they are often employed as standard macroeconomic 
variables in explaining the impact of corruption on per capita growth (see Freckleton et al, 
2010). The data utilised in this paper cover the period 1998 to 2009 for forty two markets and 
were obtained from the International Monetary Fund‟s International Financial Statistics and the 
World Bank‟s Statistics Database.  
 
4. Estimated Results 
The validity of the causality tests relies on having stationary series, appropriate lag lengths and 
incorporating control variables that rule out the possibility of an omitted variable being the 
driving force of the causal relationship of interest (Feige and Mcgee, 1977). So this section starts 
by exploring the temporal properties of the series. The results indicate that corruption (CO), per 
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capita income (GR), and  foreign and domestic investment as a percentage of GDP ((FDI_GDP) 
and (Invt_GDP)) are all stationary in levels. The series are also checked for cross sectional 
dependence, and nonlinearity using the method developed by Pesaran (2007) which combines 
the cross averages of lagged levels and first differences of the series, known as the cross 
sectional augmented DF regression (CADF).  These results indicate that most of the countries in 
the sample displayed linear and independence behaviour.  Note all of the above mentioned 
results were not reported due to space considerations but are available on request.  Once the 
variables are stationary and independent, the panel Granger causality tests can be conducted on 
the statistical significance of the regression coefficients using the above mentioned Wald 
statistics.  
 
 
 
4.1 Linear Panel Causality Results 
Two types of panel regression methods are considered; the pooled ordinary least square (OLS) 
model and the fixed effects model. The pooled OLS model assumes no variation of the 
coefficients and intercept terms while the fixed effects model allows for variation within each 
country intercept (Hsiao, 2003; Craigwell and Moore, 2008). The test statistics, based on the two 
panel regression methods, are given for lags 1 to 3; an F test was used to test restrictions on the 
coefficients at the chosen lag lengths which were determined by the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion 
(SBC), given the relatively small sample utilized here. 
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The HC test results seen in Table 1 reveal a strong causal relationship from corruption to FDI, 
and a similar link from FDI to corruption. To ensure that the model in Table 1 is well specified, 
per capita GDP and domestic investments as a percentage of GDP are added as control variables. 
These results are displayed in Table 2 and revealed similar underlying results as those derived 
from Table 1.  
With evidence that corruption causes FDI, country specific causal tests of the HINC form can be 
conducted (Hood et al., 2008; Craigwell and Moore, 2008). Utilizing the HINC tests, the 
regression coefficients across countries are statistically different from zero and the null 
hypothesis is rejected (Table 1).  The HENC  test is also used to determine if the ik  coefficients 
are different across countries. Table 2 shows the majority of the markets indicate causality 
between corruption and FDI, 27 markets suggests a bidirectional causal link between FDI and 
corruption and all but one market indicate that FDI Granger caused corruption.  
4.2: Non-linear Panel Causality Results 
The non-linear panel causality results seen in Table 3 show that the hypothesis of corruption 
Granger causing economic growth is rejected contrasting with the acceptance findings that 
economic growth Granger leads corruption.  Since there is evidence of causality, as in the linear 
panel investigations, country specific non-linear panel causal checks are made utilizing the HC 
and HINC tests (Table 4). In contrast to the linear tests, the results indicate that the majority of 
the markets (33) revealed that FDI Granger leads corruption, 16 markets has a significant non-
linear causal relationship from corruption to FDI while there was bi directional links for 11 
markets and 4 markets had no pattern. 
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Conclusion 
This paper aims at determining the causal relationship between FDI and corruption in 42 
developing countries using linear and non linear panel methods over the period 1998 to 2009. 
The findings show that the outcome of the causal association depends on the method used. The 
linear panel methods revealed that the majority of the markets indicate causality between 
corruption and FDI, 27 markets suggests a bidirectional causal link between FDI and corruption 
and all but one market indicate that FDI Granger caused corruption.  In contrast, for the 
nonlinear tests, 9 markets show no discernable pattern, the majority of the markets (33) revealed 
that FDI Granger leads corruption, 16 markets have a significant non-linear causal relationship 
from corruption to FDI while there was bi directional links for 11 markets  
The general value of the above results is that adequate institutional facilities must be in place in 
developing economies to reduce losses from corruption especially in a further attempt to attract 
FDI.  
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Table 1: Homogenous and Instantaneous Non-Causality Tests (No Controls and Controls) 
   
HINC 
  
HINC 
  
HC 
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(No 
Controls) 
(With 
Controls) 
 Lags OLS – 
Levels 
Fixed 
effects – 
Levels 
OLS – 
Levels 
Fixed 
effects – 
Levels 
OLS – 
Levels 
Fixed 
effects 
– 
Levels 
FDICO   1 34.85*** 4.41*** 23.76*** 3.81*** 8.41*** 3.17*** 
 2 33.24*** 4.36*** 20.87***   3.52*** 7.02*** 2.89*** 
 3 30.71***  2.81*** 17.43*** 2.17** 5.99*** 2.30** 
        
COFDI   1 34.94*** 4.44*** 22.28*** 3.24*** 7.12*** 2.15** 
 2 33.24*** 2.62*** 19.07*** 2.91*** 6.29*** 2.08** 
 3 31.61*** 3.09*** 17.66*** 2.04** 5.27*** 1.67* 
Note: ***,** and * indicates significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Heterogeneous Granger Causality Tests 
Country FDICO   COFDI   
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Argentina 3.63*** 4.70*** 
Belarus -0.44 8.93*** 
Belgium 7.99*** 6.03*** 
Bolivia 9.59*** 0.97 
Botswana -0.15 12.96*** 
Brazil 1.26 8.44*** 
Bulgaria 5.78*** 4.10*** 
Cameroon 2.74*** 4.22*** 
Chile 3.61*** 11.75*** 
China 0.45 8.35*** 
Colombia 1.94* 7.77*** 
Costa Rica  0.76               9.95*** 
Ecuador 4.86*** 3.31*** 
Egypt 3.07*** 6.04*** 
Estonia 4.91*** 7.79*** 
Ghana 2.19** 7.25*** 
Guatemala 1.70* 5.94*** 
Hungary 5.14*** 6.69*** 
Indonesia 1.13 4.14*** 
India -0.65 8.07*** 
Jamaica 7.73*** 3.51*** 
Jordan 5.97*** 5.62*** 
Kenya -0.04 5.40*** 
Malaysia 3.34*** 7.75*** 
Mexico 2.02** 7.51*** 
Namibia 3.43*** 8.13*** 
Nicaragua 6.39*** 2.94*** 
Pakistan 0.83 5.35*** 
Paraguay 2.56** 4.26*** 
Peru 0.93 8.93*** 
Philippines 1.66* 6.39*** 
Poland 2.09** 7.81*** 
Romania 2.66*** 6.00*** 
South Africa 1.94* 9.99*** 
El Salvador 1.26 9.00*** 
Senegal -0.76 8.42*** 
Tunisia 6.13*** 6.08*** 
Turkey 0.09 8.47*** 
Uganda 2.84*** 4.84*** 
Ukraine 2.11** 5.11*** 
Uruguay -0.20 14.25*** 
Venezuela 5.00*** 3.12*** 
 
Table 3a: Non-Linear Causality Results: Dependent Variable (CO) 
18 
 
Causal Variable Lags Coefficient t-statistic 
FDI 1 0.168 28.38*** 
FDI
2
 2 -0.001 -12.42*** 
FDI
3
 3 0.00026            3.70 
ln(FDI) 1 -0.13 -5.86*** 
ln(FDI)
2
 1 0.0009 1.15 
ln(FDI)
3
 1 -0.0004 -1.09* 
 
Table 3b: Non-Linear Causality Results: Dependent Variable (FDI) 
Causal Variable Lags Coefficient t-statistic 
CO 1 5.84 5.22*** 
CO
2
 2 0.77             2.10** 
CO
3
 3 -0.03 -0.98 
ln(CO) 1 3.95 0.86 
ln(CO)
2
 1 -0.23 -0.04 
ln(CO)
3
 1 -1.62   -0.38 
Note: ***,**  and * indicates signif icance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level of testing, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Heterogeneous Granger Non-Linear Causality Tests 
Country FDICO   COFDI   
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Argentina 1.90* 0.04 
Belarus -1.92* 8.08*** 
Belgium 4.16*** 4.79*** 
Bolivia 6.34*** -2.94*** 
Botswana -2.73*** 9.69*** 
Brazil -0.43 4.81*** 
Bulgaria 3.64*** 1.08 
Cameroon 1.30 0.49 
Chile 0.26 6.05*** 
China -0.99 5.44*** 
Colombia -0.04 4.19*** 
Costa Rica  -0.90 6.35*** 
Ecuador 2.38** -2.00** 
Egypt 1.27 1.43 
Estonia 2.44** 3.86*** 
Ghana 0.51 3.05*** 
Guatemala 0.21 1.86* 
Hungary 2.51** 2.02** 
Indonesia -0.09 3.22*** 
India -1.51 8.45*** 
Jamaica 5.26*** -0.47 
Jordan 3.64*** 3.19*** 
Kenya -0.79 4.43*** 
Malaysia 0.37 3.06*** 
Mexico 0.41 3.29*** 
Namibia 0.722 2.81*** 
Nicaragua 4.70*** -1.90 
Pakistan -0.18 3.92*** 
Paraguay 1.11 0.43 
Peru -0.49 4.87*** 
Philippines -0.14 2.11*** 
Poland 0.51 3.49*** 
Romania 1.32 2.29*** 
South Africa -0.13 5.17*** 
El Salvador -0.36 5.46*** 
Senegal -1.95* 9.02*** 
Tunisia 3.05*** 1.45 
Turkey -1.07 7.63*** 
Uganda 1.60 1.05 
Ukraine 0.90 2.15** 
Uruguay -2.15** 13.83*** 
Venezuela 2.85*** -1.95* 
 
 
